Networks of Rebellion PDF/EPUB ↠ Networks of PDF \

Networks of Rebellion PDF/EPUB ↠ Networks of PDF \


Networks of Rebellion ❮PDF / Epub❯ ☁ Networks of Rebellion ✍ Author Paul Staniland – Centrumpowypadkowe.co.uk The organizational cohesion of insurgent groups is central to explaining patterns of violence, the effectiveness of counterinsurgency, and civil war outcomes Cohesive insurgent groups produce effectiv The organizational cohesion of insurgent groups is central to explaining patterns of violence, the effectiveness of counterinsurgency, and civil war outcomes Cohesive insurgent groups produce effective war fighting forces and are credible negotiators organizational cohesion shapes both the duration of wars and their ultimate resolution In Networks of Rebellion, Paul Staniland explains why insurgent leaders differ so radically in their ability to build strong organizations and why the cohesion of armed groups changes Networks of PDF \ over time during conflicts He outlines a new way of thinking about the sources and structure of insurgent groups, distinguishing among integrated, vanguard, parochial, and fragmented groupsStaniland compares insurgent groups, their differing social bases, and how the nature of the coalitions and networks within which these armed groups were built has determined their discipline and internal control He examines insurgent groups in Afghanistan,to the present day, Kashmir , Sri Lanka from the s to the defeat of the Tamil Tigers in , and several communist uprisings in Southeast Asia during the Cold War The initial organization of an insurgent group depends on the position of its leaders in prewar political networks These social bases shape what leaders can and cannot do when they build a new insurgent group Counterinsurgency, insurgent strategy, and international intervention can cause organizational change During war, insurgent groups are embedded in social ties that determine they how they organize, fight, and negotiate as these ties shift, organizational structure changes as well Scott Strauss Choice.

    Kindle Welcome to the Kindle ereader store intervention can cause organizational change During war, insurgent groups are embedded in social ties that determine they how they organize, fight, and negotiate as these ties shift, organizational structure changes as well Scott Strauss Choice."/>
  • Paperback
  • 300 pages
  • Networks of Rebellion
  • Paul Staniland
  • 02 July 2018
  • 0801479290

About the Author: Paul Staniland

Is a well known author, some of his books are a fascination for readers like in the Networks of Rebellion book, this is one of the most wanted Paul Staniland author readers around the world.



10 thoughts on “Networks of Rebellion

  1. Colin Colin says:

    This book offers a very clear analytical framework for assessing how insurgent organizational structures are shaped and constrained by their members social networks, and how this impacts their efforts to mobilize for collective action and violence As the book rightly argues, organizational structure is one of the most important determinants of insurgent behavior and conflict outcomes Within my personal reading canon, this book best complements and expands upon Abdulkader Sinno s Organizations This book offers a very clear analytical framework for assessing how insurgent organizational structures are shaped and constrained by their members social networks, and how this impacts their efforts to mobilize for collective action and violence As the book rightly argues, organizational structure is one of the most important determinants of insurgent behavior and conflict outcomes Within my personal reading canon, this book best complements and expands upon Abdulkader Sinno s Organizations at War, which attributes the relative success of the Taliban insurgency over otherfragmented anti Soviet resistance movement veterans to the Taliban s centralization and cohesion.Staniland s basic framework analyzes insurgent organizations along two axes the degree to which leaders are linked together horizontally through strong processes of control, communication, and socialization trust, and the degree to which these leaders are linked vertically to local communities Combinations along these axes which are determined and changed by the social bases of founders, their organizational efforts, and the response of counterinsurgents may produce narrowly based vanguard groups, loose coalitions of parochial commanders, or fully integrated or fragmented groups This framework is elaborated upon through case studies of insurgent organizations drawn from Kashmir, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia.As acknowledged by the author in the conclusion, the framework generally takes insurgent social networks as givens prior to the start of conflicts though the study does draw lessons for how these change over the course of the war between insurgents and counter insurgents The book does not examine in detail the question of why some social networks take the step from political to armed opposition while others do not, but makes a compelling cases that it is organizational structure that matters most in questions of war and politics, not the ideological branding, ethnic or religious identity, or even resourcing since organizational structure ultimately determines how influxes or shortages of resources will be managed My only complaint was with the explanation of how vertical linkages work centralizing horizontal ties between group leaders make intuitive sense, but the local power networks that these organizations operate above and aim to coopt and link into vertically in order to broaden their capacity sometimes seemed like a bit of a black box.All that said, this was an excellent book, a great example of accessible and policy relevant political science, and will probably form a central analytical reference point for me in the future

  2. Nick Lloyd Nick Lloyd says:

    I like this book primarily because almost everything you read on civil war insurgency looks at it from the state s perspective What policy should the state adopt in order to defeat the rebellion COIN Paying off local warlords Total war This book is one of the few to turn it around While acknowledging that state policy is important to determining outcomes, Staniland makes the case that certain types of networks are stronger than others in waging an insurgent campaign What s , these net I like this book primarily because almost everything you read on civil war insurgency looks at it from the state s perspective What policy should the state adopt in order to defeat the rebellion COIN Paying off local warlords Total war This book is one of the few to turn it around While acknowledging that state policy is important to determining outcomes, Staniland makes the case that certain types of networks are stronger than others in waging an insurgent campaign What s , these networks can change over time, based on both endogenous and exogenous factors The only shortcoming I found in this book was the author s unwillingness to differentiate between anti colonial insurgencies, such as Vietnam or Malaya, and domestic insurgencies, such as you find in Kashmir or most of Africa States fighting domestic insurgencies have a lotflexibility in how they attempt to combat the rebellion, simply because they do not face pressure either domestically or internationally to leave States fighting from across the globe, such as the case of the US in Vietnam, need to have almost everything go perfectly for them in order to achieve success, or else the rebels can maintain enough strength to simply wait them out

  3. University of Chicago Magazine University of Chicago Magazine says:

    Paul Staniland, AB 04AuthorFrom the author The organizational cohesion of insurgent groups is central to explaining patterns of violence, the effectiveness of counterinsurgency, and civil war outcomes Cohesive insurgent groups produceeffective war fighting forces and arecredible negotiators organizational cohesion shapes both the duration of wars and their ultimate resolution In Networks of Rebellion, Paul Staniland explains why insurgent leaders differ so radically in their abi Paul Staniland, AB 04AuthorFrom the author The organizational cohesion of insurgent groups is central to explaining patterns of violence, the effectiveness of counterinsurgency, and civil war outcomes Cohesive insurgent groups produceeffective war fighting forces and arecredible negotiators organizational cohesion shapes both the duration of wars and their ultimate resolution In Networks of Rebellion, Paul Staniland explains why insurgent leaders differ so radically in their ability to build strong organizations and why the cohesion of armed groups changes over time during conflicts He outlines a new way of thinking about the sources and structure of insurgent groups, distinguishing among integrated, vanguard, parochial, and fragmented groups

  4. Jaes Jaes says:

    Very important work into insurgency and proposes many probing questions about current counterinsurgency tactics in much of the world.

  5. Jon Klug Jon Klug says:

    I have to write a book review on this for Military Review, so I will update this when I have completed that effort I can say that I thought this was very much worth the time to read, and I would recommend it to serious students of insurgency, irregular warfare, strategy, and Southern Asia It s not for everyone While I liked how the author pointed out the limitations of his theory, I disliked how he used the first person, constantly referring to my theory Again, I plan to update this prelim I have to write a book review on this for Military Review, so I will update this when I have completed that effort I can say that I thought this was very much worth the time to read, and I would recommend it to serious students of insurgency, irregular warfare, strategy, and Southern Asia It s not for everyone While I liked how the author pointed out the limitations of his theory, I disliked how he used the first person, constantly referring to my theory Again, I plan to update this preliminary review

  6. Alex Linschoten Alex Linschoten says:

    Disappointing To my mind, an example of what happens when you conduct research that relies too much on secondary sources and that is too excited by coming up with neat theories that try to explain too much Things arecomplicated than that Also, the case study chapter on Afghanistan should actually be taken as a case study for what happens when you get stuck in an echo chamber with a half dozen sources on a country that all are quoting each other

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